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Summary
With the science of survival article and lately the book “bridge to the future” Potter became 
famous releasing the neologism “bioethics” and then known as the founder of bioethics. 
However, 43 years before, Jahr had proposed a similar idea in the article “Bio-ethics: reviewing 
the ethical relations of humans towards animals and plants (translated from German)”. 
We propose to correct the idea that Jahr is merely a precursor—and not a founder—of 
bioethics, here speculating the bridge bioethics of Rensselaer Potter as close similarity with 
Jahr’s thoughts. Following the “content analysis” method, a table was built to compare the 
theoretical schemes of Potter and Jahr, correlating by qualitative meta-analysis, each paragraph 
of Jahr’s base text (1927) with Potter’s analogous (1970). The similarity of the texts reveals 
that, in theory, Potter benefited from Jahrist utopia, imposing it a reductionist lineage. Potter 
expresses, therefore, an ethnological capture of jahrism.
Keywords: Potter, bridge bioethics, Jahr, bioethical imperative, similarity, content analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Biochemist and researcher in oncology at the McArdle Laboratory, University of 
Wisconsin, van Rensselaer Potter was also concerned with the environmental 
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repercussions intrinsic to the developmental model of the 1960s (Reich 1995; 
Muzur et al. 2016; ten Have 2012). His activism or bioethicism was under the strong 
influence of Aldo Leopold and Albert Schweitzer (Araújo 2004). A forestry sciences 
engineer graduate from the University of Yale, Leopold (1886-1948) completed 
his master’s degree in 1909, before dedicating himself to the US Forest Service. In 
1933, he assumed a teaching role in the discipline of Hunting Management at the 
University of Wisconsin, where he remained until his death. Leopold published about 
350 scientific articles and led efforts to preserve American wildlife. He believed:
The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, 
waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land. This sounds simple: do we 
not already sing our love for and obligation to the land of the free and the home 
of the brave? Yes, but just what and whom do we love? Certainly not the soil, 
which we are sending helter-skelter downriver. Certainly not the waters, which 
we assume have no function except to turn turbines, float barges, and carry off 
sewage. Certainly not the plants, of which we exterminate whole communities 
without batting an eye. Certainly not the animals, of which we have already 
extirpated many of the largest and most beautiful species. A land ethic of course 
cannot prevent the alteration, management, and use of these ‘resources,’ but it does 
affirm their right to continued existence, and, at least in spots, their continued 
existence in a natural state (Leopold 1989, 204).
The German theologian, organist, and doctor Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1952, the same year as his impressive lecture was 
given at the French Academy of Sciences: The problem of ethics in the evolution of 
thought. There, he sustains and reaffirms his The philosophy of civilization published 
in 1923:
Ethics grow out of the same root as world- and life-affirmation, for ethics, too, are 
nothing but reverence for life. That is what gives me the fundamental principle of 
morality, namely, that good consists in maintaining, promoting, and enhancing 
life, and that destroying, injuring, and limiting life are evil. Affirmation of the 
world, which means affirmation of the will-to-live that manifests itself around 
me, is only possible if I devote myself to other life. From an inner necessity, I exert 
myself in producing values and practicing ethics in the world and on the world 
even though I do not understand the meaning of the world. For in world- and life-
affirmation and in ethics I carry out the will of the universal will-to-live which 
reveals itself in me. I live my life in God, in the mysterious divine personality 
which I do not know as such in the world, but only experience as mysterious will 
within myself (Schweitzer 2010, 79).
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Recent studies proclaim Potter´s thesis, which founded his primary article (1970) 
that a “bridge to the future” is the maternal apex of bioethics (Pessini 2013; Goldim 
2009; Reich 1995). However, Potter may not have given birth to bioethics—whether 
in terms of his own gnosis or teleology and even less in relation to the Bioethics 
neologism. Our antithesis and also hypothesis announce that Potter possibly and 
subtly appropriated the ecobioethical tradition and the term “Bio-Ethik” that had 
been articulated decades before by Jahr (1926; 1927), post-World War I. “The term 
bioethics was first used in 1926 by Fritz Jahr, a Protestant pastor in Halle an der Saale, 
when he introduced his ‘Bio-ethical Imperative’ [...]” (Sass 2016, 11).
From such a dialectic emerges that the bridge bioethics of Potter (1970; 1971) did 
not materialize a Big Bang, or singularity, but instead a nuance that would have 
assimilated the Jahrist Bio-Ethik by a subliminal spiral. Since then, an intense 
theoretical and ideological clash has formed the gradual conformation of a bioethical 
structure that was potentially directly copied. This is on the fringe of Fritz Jahr, 
whose aesthetics have been recovered (Araújo 2009, 45), but in an epistemologically 
naive manner. In this light, it is important to correct the idea that Jahr is merely a 
precursor—and not a founder—of bioethics, a notion derived from Anglo-American 
ethno-colonialism. Thus, the present study aims to speculate on the bridge bioethics 
of Rensselaer Potter as a very close similarity with Jahr’s thoughts.
Therefore, documents have been filtered (Jahr 1927; Potter 1970) that will undergo 
specific analysis, setting some textual indicators: bioethics, imperative, and scientism. 
This is conducted not with the intention of pursuing taboo or crime, or in order to 
“police the academic universe in one of its reasons for existence—the wide exchange 
of ideas, hypotheses and knowledge” (Diniz and Terra 2014), but for realizing an 
archeology of narratives, to “look educationally rather than punitively” (Diniz and 
Terra 2014).
METHOD
Empirical and ethnographic evidence generated by the “content analysis” method 
has advanced in Brazil, especially in qualitative research (Flick 2009). As a technique 
or strategy for data analysis, this hermeneutic method aims to “extract meaning from 
text and image data” (Creswell 2007, 194; Denzin and Lincoln 2000; 2006). In this 
regard:
The decoding of a document can use different procedures to comprehend the profound 
meaning of the communications encrypted in it. The choice of the most appropriate 
procedure depends on the material to be analyzed, the research objectives and the 
ideological and social position of the analyzer (Chizzotti 2006, 98).
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For Bardin (2006, 38), this “content analysis” is:
[...] a set of communication analysis techniques, using systematic and objective 
procedures for describing message content. [...] The intention of content analysis 
is the inference of knowledge relative to the conditions of production (or possibly 
reception), and this inference refers to indicators (quantitative or not).
The aim of content analysis lies in “critically understanding the meaning of 
communications, their manifest or latent content, explicit or hidden meanings” 
(Chizzotti 2006, 98). Flick (2009, 291) considers it “one of the classic procedures 
for analyzing textual material, no matter what the source of that material is”. Minayo 
(2001, 74) says that content analysis is intended to verify hypotheses and to gain the 
intimate meaning of the content.
Bardin (2006) delimits and sorts three stages of content analysis, in accordance with 
which will be performed:
• pre-analysis — the stage of organization and operationalization of the substrate 
or analytical corpus in four layers: open-minded reading in approximation to the 
documentary repertoire where the data will be collected, filtering of documents 
that will undergo specific analysis, demarcation of hypotheses and objectives, 
and reference of textual indicators in those documents under analysis;
• material exploration — the stage of descriptive immersion in which analytical 
categories (taxonomic and coding systems), registration units (insights of 
meaning and, if applicable frequency counting) and contextual anchorages 
(segments or horizons of message comprehension) are delineated;
• analysis of results, inference and interpretation — the climax of digesting 
the information and inferential exegesis, providing intuitions, speculations and 
critical-reflexive analysis.
This introduction performs pre-analysis. Thereafter, the result and the discussion of 
this article concretizes, respectively, both the other phases identified by Bardin.
RESULTS
Following the methodological itinerary, a table was constructed that compares the 
theoretical schemes of Potter and Jahr. The result is a descriptive approach, which 
correlates by qualitative meta-analysis, each paragraph of Jahr’s base text (2011; 
1927) with Potter’s analogous fragment (1970):
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The strict distinction between 
animal and human being 
[Mensch], dominant in our 
European culture until the 
end of the 18th century, can-
not be supported anymore. 
Up to the French Revolution, 
the heart of the European 
human being was strug-
gling for a unity of religious, 
philosophical, and scientific 
knowledge; but such a unity 
had to be abandoned under 
the pressure of more informa-























































In the past, ethics has been 
considered the special prov-
ince of the humanities in a 
liberal arts college curricu-
lum. It has been taught along 
with logic, esthetics, and 
metaphysics, as a branch of 
philosophy. Ethics constitutes 
the study of human values, 
the ideal human character, 
morals, actions, and goals in 
largely historical terms; but 
above all ethics implies action 
according to moral standards. 
What we must now face up to 
is that human ethics cannot 
be separated from a realistic 
understanding of ecology in 
the broadest sense. Ethical 
values cannot be separated 
from biological facts. We are 
in great need of a land ethic, 
a wildlife ethic, a population 
ethic, a consumption ethic, 
an urban ethic, an interna-
tional ethic, a geriatric ethic, 
and so on. All of these prob-
lems call for actions that are 
based on values and biologi-
cal facts. All of them involve 
bioethics, and survival of the 
total ecosystem is the test of 
the value system. In this per-
spective, the phrase “surviv-
al of the fittest” is simplistic 
and parochial (Potter 1970, 
127).
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It will always be the credit 
of modern natural sciences 
to finally render an unbiased 
study of the world [Welt-
geschehen]. We would not 
be seekers of truth today, if 
we would have given up the 
results of animal experimen-
tation, blood research etc.. 
On the other hand, we can-
not deny that precisely these 
scientific triumphs of the 
human spirit have infringed 
upon the dominant position 
of the human being in the 
world in general. Philosophy, 
formerly prescribing leading 
ideals for the natural scienc-
es, now has to build her sys-
tems on the basis of specific 
knowledge from the natural 
sciences, - and it was only a 
poetic-philosophical [dich-
terphilosophische] interpre-
tation of Darwin’s insight, 
when Nietzsche considered 
humans to be a somewhat 
inferior stage towards a high-
er stage in evolution, as a 
‘rope extended between an-
imal and superman [Über-
mensch]’ (Jahr 2011, 1).
What resulted from this revo-
lution? First, the fundamen-
tal equalization of human 
being and animal as an ob-
ject in psychology. Today, it 
[psychology] does not restrict 
itself to human beings, but 
applies the same methods to 
animals as well; and, as doc-














































































Mankind is urgently in need 
of new wisdom that will pro-
vide the “knowledge of how 
to use knowledge” for man’s 
survival and for improve-
ment in the quality of life. 
This concept of wisdom as a 
guide for action—the knowl-
edge of how to use knowledge 
for the social good—might 
be called “the science of sur-
vival,” surely the prerequisite 
to improvement in the qual-
ity of life. I take the position 
that the science of survival 
must be built on the science 
of biology, enlarged beyond 
the traditional boundaries 
to include the most essential 
elements of the social sciences 
and the humanities with em-
phasis on philosophy in the 
strict sense, meaning “love of 
wisdom.” A science of surviv-
al must be more than science 
alone, and I therefore pro-
pose the term “bioethics” in 
order to emphasize the two 
most important ingredients 
in achieving the new wisdom 
that is so desperately needed: 
biological knowledge and 
human values (Potter 1970, 
127-128).
In this age of specialization, 
we seem to have lost contact 
with the daily reminders that 
must have driven home the 
truth to our ancestors: man 
cannot live without harvest-
ing plants or killing animals. 
If plants wither and die and 
animals fail to reproduce, 
man will sicken and die and 
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atomical-zoological research, 
quite instructive comparisons 
between human soul and 
animal soul have been done. 
Yes, even beginnings of plant 
psychology are visible, - the 
most prominent representa-
tives are G. Th. Fechner in 
the past, R. H. France, Ad. 
Wagner and the Indian Bose 
at present, so that modern 
research in psychology covers 
all living beings in research. 
Given these circumstances, it 
is only logical when R. Eisler 
speaks of Bio-Psychik (science 


































fail to maintain his kind. As 
individuals, we cannot af-
ford to leave our destiny in 
the hands of scientists, engi-
neers, technologists, and poli-
ticians who have forgotten or 
who never knew these simple 
truths. In our modern world, 
we have botanists who study 
plants and zoologists who 
study animals, but most of 
them are specialists who do 
not deal with the ramifica-
tions of their limited knowl-
edge. We need biologists today 
who respect the fragile web of 
life and who can broaden 
their knowledge to include 
the nature of man and his 
relation to the biological and 
physical worlds. We need bi-
ologists who can tell us what 
we can and must do to sur-
vive, and what we cannot 
and must not do if we hope 
to maintain and improve the 
quality of life during the next 
three decades. The fate of the 
world rests on the integra-
tion, preservation, and exten-
sion of the knowledge that is 
possessed by a relatively small 
number of men, who are only 
just beginning to realize how 
inadequate is their strength, 
how enormous the task. Every 
college student owes it to him-
self and his children to learn 
as much as possible of what 
these men have to offer, to 
challenge them, to meld bio-
logical knowledge with what-
ever additional ingredient 
they are able to master, and 
to become, if their talents are 
JAHR  Vol. 11/1  No. 21  2020
112
From Bio-Psychik it is only 
a step to Bio-Ethics, i.e. the 
assumption of moral obliga-
tions not only towards hu-
mans, but towards all forms 
of life. In reality, bio-ethics is 
not just a discovery of modern 
times. An especially attractive 
example from the past is the 
figure of St. Francis of Assisi 
(1182-1226) with his great 
love towards animals, his 
warm sympathy for all forms 
of life, centuries before Rous-
seau’s romanticism for the 





































adequate, the leaders of to-
morrow. From such a pooling 
of knowledge and values may 
come a new kind of scholar 
or statesman who has mas-
tered what I have referred to 
as “bioethics.” No individual 
could possibly master all of 
the components of this branch 
of knowledge, just as no one 
today knows all of zoology or 
all of chemistry, but what is 
needed is a new discipline to 
provide models of life styles 
for people who can commu-
nicate with each other and 
propose and explain the new 
public policies that could pro-
vide a “bridge to the future.” 
The new disciplines will be 
forged in the heat of today’s 
crisis problems, all of which 
require some kind of a mix 
among basic biology, social 
sciences, and the humanities 
(Potter 1970, 128).
The age-old questions about 
the nature of man and his 
relation to the world become 
increasingly important as we 
approach the remaining three 
decades in this century, when 
political decisions made in ig-
norance of biological knowl-
edge, or in defiance of it, may 
jeopardize man’s future and 
indeed the future of earth’s 
biological resources for hu-
man needs. As individuals, 
we speak of the “instinct for 
survival,” but the sum total 
of all our individual instincts 
for survival is not enough to 
guarantee the survival of the 
human race in a form that 
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eschatol-
















any of us would willingly 
accept. An instinct for sur-
vival is not enough. We must 
develop the science of surviv-
al, and it must start with a 
new kind of ethics—bio-
ethics. The new ethics might 
be called interdisciplinary 
ethics, defining “interdisci-
plinary” in a special way to 
include both the sciences and 
the humanities, but this term 
is rejected because the mean-
ing is not self-evident (Potter 
1970, 130).
When the unity of the Euro-
pean weltanschauung broke 
down at the end of the Ba-
roque period, European in-
tellectual life for the first time 
was able to receive without 
prejudice foreign worlds of 
thought [Gedankenwelten] 
without prejudice. Already 
Herder’s comprehensive spirit 
- probably the most sensitive 
in those days for things to 
come - expected of humans, 
based on the image of an all 
encompassing deity, that they 
project themselves into each 
and every creature and sense 
with it the way it needs. Such 
a reasoning already reminds 
us of the Indian philosophy, 
which by the way of England 
just had been discovered. But 
only during the time of Ro-
manticism has India really 
influenced European intel-
lectual life, and especially in 
Germany, its most important 
province. The teaching of 


















































Before presenting the mech-
anistic concepts, it may be 
desirable to first mention 
the nature of the scientific 
revolution and some of the 
major historical polarizing 
views of mechanism versus 
vitalism and reductionism 
versus holism, which in my 
opinion have delayed the 
development of a broad and 
unified biologically oriented 
value system. Reductionism 
and mechanism are the as-
pects of biology that push the 
dissection of the living organ-
ism to the smallest possible 
units, inquiring at each stage 
how the units interact. As the 
dissection has proceeded to 
the level of atoms and mole-
cules, the new biologists have 
become chemists, taking the 
name molecular biologists, 
and have given the impres-
sion that they are concerned 
not with the organism but 
only with the parts. These 
biologists frequently present 
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in India, has influenced the 
reasoning of Indian schools 
of philosophy, especially the 
school of Sankya. An offspring 
of this school is the yoga teach-
ing, drawing the most rigor-
ous consequences from those 
thought processes. The yoga 
repentant [Jogabüßer] under 
no circumstances is allowed 
to live at the cost of co-crea-
tures; above all, he shall un-
der no circumstances kill any 
animal, and only under cer-
tain settings enjoy vegetable 
foods. He has to wear a veil 
over his mouth in order not 
to inhale even a small living 
being; for the same reason, he 
has to filter drinking water 
and shall not take a bath. 
The passion to not harm a 
living being in the process of 
self-preservation even leads 
some Indian repentant to eat 
horse manure. If in this con-
text Buddha is mentioned, 
one has to stress that especial-
ly this religious leader refused 
such fanatic self-harm of the 
school of yoga. Buddha for-
bade, that food be based on 
animal products, but fully 
allows vegetable based foods. 
How much Buddha himself 
and his teachings totally be-
lieved in reincarnation of the 
soul, is very well demonstrat-
ed for us Europeans by the 
collection of Buddhist stories 
collected by Jatakas, stories 
ascribed to Buddha and nar-
rating about his early life. He 
claims that he has lived as a 
human being before, but also 
the popular image of scientist 
as opposed to humanist, and 
their contribution to bioeth-
ics is the reductionist knowl-
edge that comes from the 
laboratory. Meanwhile, the 
biologists concerned with the 
whole organism, the holists, 
tend toward the humanistic 
side of the balance, but not 
so far as the vitalists, who 
in most cases today are not 
professional biologists. The 
vitalists are frequently people 
in the humanities or people 
whose religious convictions 
affect their introspective at-
tempts to understand biology. 
Some highly respected biol-
ogists of earlier times were 
vitalists for historical reasons, 
that is, they were unable to 
explain their observations 
without invoking the idea 
that mysterious or supernatu-
ral (“vital”) forces guided all 
living organisms, hence the 
concept of vitalism. I hope 
to make clear my own view-
point that bioethics should 
attempt to integrate the re-
ductionistic and mechanistic 
principles with the holistic 
principles. Moreover, bioeth-
ics should examine the nature 
of human knowledge and its 
limitations because, in my 
opinion, it is in this area 
that the only valid residue 
of vitalism makes its stand. 
Bioethics should develop a 
realistic understanding of 
biological knowledge and its 
limitations in order to make 
recommendations in the 
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remembers his former lives 
as an elephant, a gazelle, a 
crab, etc.. Even more beauti-
ful than in Francis of Assisi, 
these narratives express the 
thought, that a human be-
ing in essence is related to all 
creatures (Jahr 2011, 2).
field of public policy (Potter 
1970, 130-131).
Such sequences of reasoning 
caused similar thoughts in 
European intellectual life, 
even if not in such a strict 
version. Theologian Schlei-
ermacher (1768-1834) de-
clared it to be immoral to 
destroy life and formation 
[Leben und Gestaltung], 
as they are, if there is no 
reasonable cause to do so. 
Similarly, the philosopher 
Krause, a contemporary of 
Schleiermacher, requests to 
respect each and every living 
being and not to destroy it 
without reason. Because, they 
all, plants and animals, also 
humans, have similar rights, 
but not Equal Right, depend-
ing on the requirements for 
reaching their specific destiny. 
The philosopher Schopenhau-
er, who claimed as special im-
portance of his ethics as based 
primarily on the sentiment of 
compassion, required towards 
animals as well, openly re-
ferred to the Indian intellec-
tual world [Gedankenwelt]. 
Via Richard Wagner, who 
was strongly influenced by 
Schopenhauer and a com-
passionate animal lover and 
friend of animal protection, 
those thoughts have become a 





















































In order to understand where 
contemporary biology stands, 
we need to look upon bio-
logical science as one of the 
consequences of the scien-
tific revolution. Biological 
knowledge is not something 
that can be gained by intro-
spection alone. The reason 
for doubting the validity of 
unsupported introspection is 
based on cumulative knowl-
edge about human behavior: 
we all have built-in instincts 
for self- and ego preserva-
tion, and we have passions, 
emotions, and irrational 
moments. Moreover, we are 
built in such a way that each 
new idea appears to solve 
some problem and creates in 
us a glow of euphoria. We 
feel that we have the answer 
to whatever it was that stim-
ulated us, however transient 
the feeling may be. Each of 
the great advances in biology, 
such as Mendelian genetics 
and Darwinian evolution, 
was based on years of exper-
imentation and observation. 
Nevertheless, these advances 
had to overcome the previous 
and persisting ideas that had 
been arrived at by men whose 
ideas came from within and 
were reinforced by a euphoria 
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group of people (Jahr 2011, 
2-3).
Thus, in regard to animals, 
such a rule has become evi-
dent, at least as far as need-
less torture is concerned. 
With plants, it is different, 
so. For some, it seems at first 
unreasonable to have certain 
ethical obligations towards 
plants. But already [Apostle] 
Paul directed our compassion 
towards animals and plants. 
Comparable are the illumi-
nated sentimental [verklärt 
stimungsvollen] interpreta-
tions in Richard Wagner’s 
3rd act of ‘Parsifal’. In pious 
devotion, humans at least on 
Good Friday avoid hurting 
stalks and flowers in the fields 
by walking more carefully. 
But also in the thoughts of 
plant ethics by a sober phi-
losopher such as Eduard von 














































that was personally convinc-
ing. Many of the deep-rooted 
ideas remaining in the world 
today—not only in science 
but in all fields—were orig-
inated by individual men 
who were convinced that they 
knew truth from within (or 
by a proclaimed revelation 
from an outside source) and 
who by strength of personali-
ty were able to gain momen-
tum enough to silence their 
possible critics. Obviously 
some ideas have been helpful, 
while others (for example, 
those of Hitler) have been the 
source of much trouble in the 
world (Potter 1970, 131-
132).
Biology is more than botany 
and zoology. It is the foun-
dation on which we build 
ecology, which is the relation 
among plants, animals, man, 
and the physical environ-
ment. Biology includes the 
sciences of genetics, which has 
to do with all aspects of he-
redity, and physiology, which 
deals with the function of 
individuals. For thousands 
of years, men have lived on 
this earth with no generally 
disseminated knowledge of 
their chemical nature. Man’s 
dependence upon his natural 
environment was widely un-
derstood, but nature’s bounty 
was considered to be limit-
less and nature’s capacity to 
recover from exploitation 
was considered to be ample. 
Eventually it came to be real-
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20 years ago, we find similar 
thoughts. In an article on 
flower luxury, he describes a 
cut flower: ‘She is an organ-
ism deadly hurt, but only 
her colors not yet destroyed, a 
head still there, but separated 
from the torso. – Whenever 
I see a rose in a glass of wa-
ter or tied into a bouquet, I 
cannot fight the unpleasant 
thought that a human being 
has murdered a flower life for 
the sole purpose to enjoy his/
her eyes while dying, heart-
less enough eyes, not to sense 
an unnatural death under 
the appearance of life’ (Jahr 
2011, 3).
A majority of people natu-
rally is not as sensitive as Ed. 
von Hartmann. However, 
everyone knows quite well, 
that plants are living be-
ings, and that cutting flowers 
hurts them; but the thought 
that the flower might sense 
it, is far away. The concept 
of a plant-soul so far has not 
taken hold in us. Additional, 
we know that flowers also die 
and dry out, while they are 
on the plant, and therefore 
one does not take issue with 
cutting flowers, in particular 
when they were cultivated for 
that specific purpose (Jahr 
2011, 3).
ized that man was exploiting 
the earth to an extent that 
required the use of more and 
more science and technology 
as the richest sources of iron 
and copper, for example, 
were used up. From the bio-
logical stand-point, man has 
progressively taken over the 
planet’s resources by decreas-
ing the numbers and kinds 
of other species of life and by 
increasing only those species 
that were useful to man, such 
as wheat, beef cattle, and 
other consumables. As a can-
cer specialist, I was naturally 
impressed with N. J. Berrill’s 
statement, which has been 
repeated in various forms by 
others without citation since 
the publication of his Man’s 
Emerging Mind in 1955 [1, 
p. 210]. He observed that 
“so far as the rest of nature 
is concerned, we are like a 
cancer whose strange cells 
multiply without restraint, 
ruthlessly demanding the 
nourishment that all of the 
body has need of. The anal-
ogy is not farfetched for can-
cer cells no more than whole 
organisms know when to stop 
multiplying, and sooner or 
later, the body of the commu-
nity is starved of support and 
dies.” In other words, we can 
ask the question, is it man’s 
fate to be to the living earth 
what cancer is to man? (Pot-
ter 1970, 128-129).
Thus, we start from a totally 
different point of view than 







The concept of life as a cy-
bernetic machine has been 
admirably discussed by Rein-
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not want to hurt any living 
entity. Also, our regulations 
by law and police protect 
specific plants and flowers in 
certain areas (such as plants 
in the Alps) are based on to-
tally different assumptions. 
The police state [Polizeistaat] 
intends to protect those plants 
from becoming extinct in 
those areas, also to be enjoyed 
by other people in the future. 
Whenever there are plants 
abundant, the state does not 
intervene to protect them as 
an end in themselves (Jahr 
2011, 3).
Also, our concept of animal 
protection rests on a decided-
ly different foundation than 
the attitude of the Indians. 
When we read in the nov-
el ‘Holy Hate’ [Der heilige 
Hass] by Richard Voss, that 
a Rodyia-boy, i.e. a member 
of a despised caste, does even 
not want to kill a snake, be-
cause ‘also the snakes are our 
brothers and sisters’, we do 
not accept such a reasoning; 
we actually hold it to be our 
duty to kill harmful animals, 
if we can. We have our farm 
animals been killed by the 




















































er in the publication [...] re-
ferred to earlier, and if this is 
a correct image, the human-
istic biologist will have to ad-
just to it. I have only to add 
one more ingredient that was 
not stressed by Reiner, name-
ly, the quality of disorder. I 
would agree with Reiner that 
man can be described as an 
adaptive control system, but 
I would insist that it is not 
enough to assume that the 
quality of disorder is implicit 
in that definition. I would 
insist that it be explicit. Thus 
I would postulate that man 
is an adaptive control system 
with elements of disorder 
built into every hierarchical 
level. Reiner has emphasized 
the description of machines 
or control devices in terms of 
the “mode of operation” and 
the “mode of control,” each of 
which may be fixed or varia-
ble (Potter 1970, 138).
No correspondent.
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prey by the hunter, because 
we want to eat meat, which 
in our areas some do not 
want to do without, while in 
tropical countries vegetarian 









Our animal protection, thus, 
has a utilitarian aspect, 
which is daringly disregarded 
by the Indians, while we con-
tent ourselves with avoidance 
of unnecessary suffering. Un-
fortunately, legal regulations 
against prevention or punish-
ment of those cruelties are not 
strong enough in all civilized 










ism and the 














But, we are on the road of 
progress and animal pro-
tection gets more and more 
support in wider circles, such 
as no decent human being 
[anständiger Mensch] will 
without criticism accept, that 
a thoughtless lout [Flegel] 
without any afterthought 
beheads flowers with a stick 
while on the hike or that 
children break flowers only 
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few steps. Our self-education, 
in this regard, already has 
made considerable progress, 
but we have to go further, so 
that the guiding rule for our 
actions may be the bio-ethical 
demand: ‘Respect every living 
being on principle as an end 
in itself and treat it, if possi-
ble, as such!’ (Jahr 2011, 4).
eschatol-









Jahr versus Potter: a comparative analysis of “Fragments”
Following is an analysis of the horizontally scribed fragments (columns 1 and 3) in 
the results table.
Jahr’s “Bio-Ethik” initially posits the plural character of knowledge after the French 
Revolution (Steger 2015) and Europe’s overcoming of the dissociation between 
animal, vegetable, and human being since the nineteenth century. Potter, however, 
takes over and makes a clean slate from the Jahrist perspective, preaching a general 
eco-ethics of survival, or “Bioethics”, from the axiology of biological facts, valid to 
every ecosystem, and that it is a conglomeration of ethical points: urban, international, 
demographic.
Jahr celebrates the triumph of the neutrality of modern natural sciences, which 
methodologically came to guide his own philosophy (Rinčić and Muzur 2019). 
Potter takes this conviction to the extreme, seeking a vital “knowledge of how to 
use knowledge” (Potter 1970, 127) as a factor of quality of life, and embodied in a 
bioethic as a social-ethic and eco-humanitarian «super biology».
In addition, the Jahr’s discourse reiterates the radical equivalence between animal 
and human, the object of a “Biopsychology” of the soul, or awakening of symbiotic 
consciousness, trans-specialized (planetary holism), as a precursor of its counter-
utilitarian Bio-Ethik. Potter also brings a similar premise: modern specialization has 
made us forget the ancestral truth that we cannot survive devastating plants, animals 
and mining. Hence the urgency of bioethics—the cybernetic-interdisciplinary 
provider of “new public policies that could provide a ‘bridge to the future’ [...]” 
(Potter 1970, 128).
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Jahr versus Potter: a comparative analysis of “Exploration of the 
material”
Columns 2 and 4 of the table elucidate that:
• the “Bio-Ethik” translates to a moral-epistemological imperative, reduced in 
Potter to the condition of “super biology” or sui generis scientism. It is the 
epistemology (philosophy of science) being dangerously replaced by a scientific 
epistemology;
• in founding bioethics, Jahr explores critical points to survival today, using the 
example of consumerism—which has no accurate equivalent in Potter (1970);
• while Jahr (2011; 1927) is the proclaimer of a broad bioethical manifest, 
Potter (1970) deals with substantially more dramatic and hostile threats, 
often innovative and on a global scale (nuclear-arms race, the exasperation 
of dependence on fossil fuels, genetic manipulation and biopower, terrorism, 
telematics nanotechnology, cybernetic intelligence, demographic explosion), 
stylizing redeeming, positivist and academicist biologism;
• experiencing distinct global crises, both express eschatological or apocalyptic 
concern about the destiny of the biosphere. Jahr does so as a Protestant 
theologian in the post-First World War. Whilst Potter, a post-war biochemical 
oncologist, follows Jesuit orientation, evidenced by striking reference (Potter 
1970) to the studies of Teilhard de Chardin.
Complementary analysis
In interacting with Jahr under the Kantian tradition, Schweitzer proposed an entire 
eco-ethics that amalgamated with Leopold’s, which was endorsed and used by Potter 
(1970; 1971; 1988; Araújo 2004) in the possible semantic expropriation of the term 
and sign “Bioethics”. Its first allusion dates back to 1927 when Fritz Jahr wrote 
Bio-Ethik. Eine Umschau über die ethischen Beziehungen des Menschen zu Tier und 
Pflanze (Bio-ethics, an overview of the ethical relations of humans towards animals 
and plants).
Moreover, Schweitzer and Jahr are German contemporaries, gravitate to the same 
symbolic framework. The fact that Potter had known of Schweitzer’s eco-ethics 
introduces speculation: it is likely that Potter´s bioethics had access to the neologism 
of Jahr. Yet how did such a synergy occur on the German-American axis, to obfuscate 
and colonize Jahr’s ecobioethical-global legacy? Potter reproduces and eclipses it since 
the biennium of 1970-71:
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We are in great need of a land ethic, a wildlife ethic, a population ethic, a 
consumption ethic, an urban ethic, an international ethic, a geriatric ethic, and 
so on. All of these problems call for actions that are based on values and biological 
facts. All of them involve bioethics, and survival of the total ecosystem is the test 
of the value system. [...] The new ethics might be called interdisciplinary ethics, 
defining “interdisciplinary” in a special way to include both the sciences and the 
humanities, but this term is rejected because the meaning is not self-evident (Potter 
1970, 127-130).
In Bioethics, the science of survival. Perspectives in biology and medicine, which 
inaugurated the game of imitation, Potter (1970) reedited the Jahrist genesis of an 
interdisciplinary eco-ethics of planetary survival. This initiative was consummated 
in Bioethics: bridge to the future (Potter 1971), where chapter 1 is an adaptation of 
the Potter article of 1970. Here, a prophetic Rensselaer Potter may have taken hold 
of (hypothesis) the integrative worldview of Jahr, achieving it by the simulacrum of 
bridge bioethics. Potter (1970; 1971), however, did not even genuinely innovate 
with his metaphor or “credo” (Potter 1994, 193-195) of an intergenerational link 
between biological knowledge and fundamental values of the human person.
I therefore propose the term “bioethics” in order to emphasize the two most 
important ingredients in achieving the new wisdom that is so desperately needed: 
biological knowledge and human values (Potter 1970, 127-128).
An almost forgotten Jahr (1927; Engels 2004; Araújo 2009; Čović et al. 2011, 587-
588) reflected inasmuch the bioethical determinants, the magnitude and emergence 
of ecological challenges inherent to global coexistence. Thus, the Potterian paradigm 
is possibly a Bio-Ethik’s hyper-realistic (photorealistic) artifact — it is no coincidence 
that hyper-realism translates, in the late 1960s, into New York and Californian 
artistic expression (Meisel 1981). The Potter Bridge also tends to illustrate a reverse 
engineering vector. It channeled geopolitical transmigration of that bioethical German 
imperative, which is proclaimed by Paul Max Fritz Jahr (1895-1953), baptizing it into 
English, the language of modern science (Di Bitetti and Ferreras 2017). However, 
this linguistic Darwinism does not undo Potter’s plausible similarity either.
In spite of Potter’s influence, lucidity discerns that his narrative may presuppose a 
linguistically sacralized (or dogmatized) copy. If this is correct, the bridge bioethics 
consubstantiates a holographic projection, not creative transposition. Current 
literature, by means of expert bioethicists (Goldim 2009; Muzur and Rinčić 2011; 
Muzur and Sass 2012; Muzur and Rinčić 2019; Pessini 2013), has already relocated 
from Potter to Jahr the emergence of the bioethics as a “noun” though not of the 
bioethics as a “verb”, which is the task of this article. The authorial historiography of 
bioethics shows, therefore, a clear tendency of adjustment:
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Until very recently, the American biochemist Rensselaer Potter was recognized 
as the first person who used the neologism bioethics. However, in 1997, at a 
conference in Tübingen, Professor Rolf Loether of the Humboldt University of 
Berlin mentioned Fritz Jahr, who claimed to have cewoined the word Bio-Ethik 
in 1927. According to his report, Loether first heard the term “bioethics” in the 
early 1990s. Once the term seemed familiar to him, he began to look for it in the 
numerous publications of the famous periodical Kosmos, left by his grandfather.  In 
the editorial of the 1927 volume, he found Jahr’s historical article entitled “Bio-
ethics, an overview of the ethical relations of humans towards animals and plants.” 
The discovery of this work was propagated by Eve-Marie Engels, of the University 
of Tübingen. She organized and edited the annals of the congress at which Loether 
had participated. Engels mentioned Loether’s discovery in the article “Bioethik,” 
in Metzler Lexicon, in 1999, which was subsequently translated into Portuguese 
and republished in 2004 in the Brazilian magazine “Veritas.” This text caught 
the attention of biologist José Roberto Goldim, who wrote two articles revisiting 
the beginning of bioethics and the contribution of Fritz Jahr. A more detailed 
analysis of Jahr’s ideas was elaborated by Hans-Martin Sass, a fellow countryman 
who worked for many years at the Kennedy Institute of Bioethics. [...] In the last 
few years, publications about Fritz Jahr have begun to appear, as well as scientific 
events such as the “1st International Congress on Fritz Jahr and the European roots 
of bioethics,” held in the city of Rijeka, Croatia on 11th and 12th March 2011. In 
2008, at the same Adriatic coastal city, the “VIII World Congress of Bioethics” was 
held, organized by the International Bioethics Association. At this congress, The 
Rijeka Declaration affirmed that Fritz Jahr had already used the term “bioethics” 
(Bio-Ethik) in 1927. His “bioethical imperative” should be considered a guide for 
personal, professional, cultural, social and political life, as well as the development 
and application of science and technology. [...] In the previously cited article 
published in Kosmos—“Bio-ethics, an overview of the ethical relations of humans 
towards animals and plants,”—Jahr proposed that the bioethical imperative be 
extended to all forms of life amplifying the moral imperative of Kant: act in such a 
way that you consider humanity, both in your person and in the person of others, 
always as an end and never as a simple medium. This proposal can be translated 
to: respect every living being as a principle and an end in itself and treat it, if 
possible, as such. Jahr’s concept of bioethics is broader than that of the American 
pioneers, including all forms of life (Pessini 2013, 13-15).
JAHR  Vol. 11/1  No. 21  2020
124
CONCLUSION
The twentieth century reverberated a legitimate concern about the pollution of our 
seas, the atmosphere and, not before long, the whole earth, emphasizing the urgency 
of the ecological issue—because the very survival of species is at stake. Nevertheless, 
this paper emphasizes more subtle indignation: the pollution or degeneration (by 
similarity) of the cultural environment, so harmful to the minds of men and their 
intelligence.
In this scenario, Potter’s intellectual longevity and stature are undeniable. His efforts 
to consolidate bioethical praxis worldwide were meaningful. However, not wanting 
this to be a plausible hypothesis, the bridge bioethics is suspected of close similarity 
with the Jahr’s thoughts. Aside from mere speculation, Potter’s monumental “bridge 
to the future” has for decades destroyed any bridge to the Jahrist-reminiscent past, 
and made the present, bias with an authenticity deficit.
Strictly speaking, etymologically, plagiarism is the “act or effect of imitating, of 
presenting, as his, the work of another person” (Cunha 1986, 611). The similarity 
of a proposition between bridge bioethics and Bio-Ethik reveals that, in theory, 
Potter took advantage of the Jahr’s utopia, imposing it a reductionist lineage. Potter 
expresses, therefore, an ethnological capture of jahrism.
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Jahr i Potter: slučajne sličnosti?
Sažetak
Člankom o znanosti preživljavanja, a kasnije i knjigom „Most prema budućnosti“, Potter je 
postao slavan upotrijebivši neologizam „bioetika“ i nakon toga poznat kao osnivač bioetike. 
Međutim, 43 godine prije Jahr je imao sličnu ideju i iznio je u članku „Bioetika: preispitivanje 
etičkih odnosa ljudi prema životinjama i biljkama (prevedeno s njemačkog)“. U radu 
predlažemo ispravljanje ideje da je Jahr samo preteča, a ne osnivač bioetike. Razmatramo 
bioetiku mosta Rensselaera Pottera kao vrlo sličnu Jahrovim mislima. Metodom „analize 
sadržaja“ napravljena  je tablica koja uspoređuje teorijske sheme Pottera i Jahra, korelirajući 
kvalitativnom metaanalizom svaki odlomak Jahrova temeljnog teksta (1927.) s Potterovim 
analognim tekstom (1970.). Sličnost tekstova otkriva da je Potter, u teoriji, imao koristi 
od Jahrove utopije, namećući joj redukcionističko podrijetlo. Potter, prema tome, izražava 
etnološki vid jahrizma.
Ključne riječi: Potter, mostovna bioetika, Jahr, bioetički imperativ, sličnost, analiza sadržaja.
